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Posts Tagged ‘pessimistic meta-induction’

Philosophy of Science v. Epistemology

In duhem, induction, quine on 23/06/2011 at 10:41 am

In light of Einstein, Rutherford, and Maxwell, if we assume the knowledge-acquiring process S employs in everyday affairs is distilled or refined in scientific practice, then the problem of induction and the Duhem-Quine thesis should have long ago put to rest any theory of knowledge that claims S can know theory 1 has a greater objective verisimilitude than theory 2.

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The Unexpected

In critical rationalism, induction on 15/06/2011 at 3:01 pm

But in all my experience, I have never been in any accident … of any sort worth speaking about. I have seen but one vessel in distress in all my years at sea. I never saw a wreck and never have been wrecked nor was I ever in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort. (E. J. Smith, 1907, Captain, RMS Titanic)

Yesterday when I was out riding my bike, my bicycle’s front tube popped with a loud BANG! After examining it later, I realized that it was no fault of the road — no sharp rock or shard of glass — but of the tube: it was worn out so much that it split at the seam. This lead me to write once again on the topic of induction. This time, I will focus on everyday examples in order to illustrate the point that inductive inferences are as unjustified as any other conjecture about the unobserved.

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