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Posts Tagged ‘kant’

From ‘Ought’ to ‘Is’

In bartley, critical rationalism, ethics on 06/09/2011 at 2:50 am

After reading Eric MacDonald’s piece on natural law theory over at Choice in Dying, I think it best to describe how a Critical Rationalist as influenced by Popper and Bartley crosses the ‘is-ought’ gap. Natural law theory seeks to ground ethics in something tangible, something that is easy to grasp. It is in the nature of things to be so, and therefore it follows that we must follow the nature of things. Of course, this indubitably begs the question of what exactly is the nature of things. To take a poor example, it is in the nature of things that bananas fit hands, but bananas also fit into orifices other than the mouth. But put this problem aside for the moment. Assume that it can be solved, or at least a group of people may come to an agreement, tentative though it may be, on the nature of things. Hume, though, notes that it is difficult to justify an ‘ought’ as logically following from an ‘is’, and does not rule this out as impossible. I, on the other hand, take this justification as impossible, since this problem of justification is little more than a variation of Fries’s trilemma: (1) either this ethical justification goes in a circle, (2) grounded on a foundation that is assumed without argument, or (3) part of an infinite series of justifications.
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Evidence

In empiricism, induction, justificationism on 19/07/2011 at 6:49 am

There is endless conjecture, and certainty is not to be counted upon (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason)

Some people treat evidence as something that accumulates over time, like sap from a tree. Once enough evidence is collected, you need only synthesize it into syrup, and then you’ve proved your point. “I have X amount of evidence for Y, therefore you ought to believe Y, otherwise you are behaving irrationally.” So the story goes.

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Rand’s Misunderstanding of Philosophy Post-Kant

In rand on 21/06/2011 at 3:28 am

¶3-4.

Dykes begins his next ‘assault’ on CR with

If it is true that our senses are pre-programmed; if it is true that ‘there is no sense organ in which anticipatory theories are not genetically incorporated’; then what flows into our minds is determined and what flows out of them is subjective. … Since it is ultimately the product of the pre-programmed interpretation of the data which entered Popper’s mind, CR is a theory which can only be applied to Popper. According to his own view of his contact with reality, he would not be able to verify the relevance of CR to anybody else (§3,¶3).

Yes, if Kant is correct in making a distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal, then there could be no such thing as direct and unmediated communication, utterly free creation of theories, and so on. What of it? Does that make CR, or any other post-Kantian stance for that matter, incorrect?

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Descartes

In justificationism, kuhn, skepticism, wittgenstein on 15/06/2011 at 3:18 pm

Justificationism in Continental Rationalism leads to a situation of salvation and damnation. The epistemologist must save some commonsensical ideas, such as other minds, an external world, the reliability of science, and cast out or exorcise supposed illegitimate foundations. She sorts out the desirable from the undesirable statements, yet to begin this sorting this requires a proper sorter.

Out of all the possible foundations for knowledge, all but one foundation will fail to correctly sort out all desirable positions. If a foundation does not succeed, it will fail to deliver the promised goods. It is one thing to question whether the system is coherent; it is another to question whether it accomplishes its task. For instance, if a proposed foundation asserts the existence of the external world, this is not a satisfactory foundation, for it does not tell us anything of importance about the external world. We are not searching for a meta-criterion, but as a criterion of preferable foundations. I want a foundation that doesn’t let too much in, yet keeps all the riffraff out.

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