The word ‘induction’ takes on many meanings, always when most convenient. Like a slippery eel, just when a critic of induction has their hands around its neck, it wiggles out once more.

Does induction refer to the ‘context of discovery’ or the ‘context of justification’?

If ‘induction’ refers to the context of discovery, the critic of induction need only point to the greatest historical developments in science. Without blinders on, the critic points out that these theories are birthed in the heat of dealing with significant scientific problems. The framework comes *before* observation (read: Einstein). How then could enumerative induction work? Theories are then imaginative creations–possible solutions to problems. Even if enumerative induction is permitted during the context of discovery, it does not help the scientist any more than dreaming next to a raging fire (read: Kekulé’s oroboros), drug use (read: Feynman, Kary Mullis), *&c.*, which is to say that is has no privileged position over even the most arbitrary ‘methods.’

If ‘induction’ refers to the context of justification, is this a process of *objective* inductive verification *à la *Carnap? If so, then this program is defunct, for no number of verifications can increase the probability assigned to a strictly universal statement. Is this the process of *subjective* certitude after repeated verifications? Then it contradicts the probability calculus *and* fails to solve the problem of underdetermination.

If ‘induction’ refers to the metaphysical assumption of regularity of systems, which we may approximate if enough inductions of the system are collected, then the inductivist retreats to asserting only that there exists regularities, calling this assumption ‘induction.’ If a proposed regularity should turn out to be false, then this was either a mistaken induction or not induction at all. If it is not an induction, then this is little more than wordplay: we cannot tell this type of induction apart from a *conjecture*. If it is a mistaken induction, this type of induction should only be known to be mistaken *in hindsight*: it tells us nothing until we learn that we are wrong.

And what is that but a falsification?

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