d

Holism

In popper, quine on 22/06/2011 at 12:54 pm

One intuitively wouldn’t want to have a set of incoherent beliefs. Preferring incoherence is to be frowned upon, for one belief in this set must be false. Any sort of epistemology should then strive for some kind of coherence and mutual support, and if incoherence is found, of finding a way to determine which member of the set is false and which is true.

There are two kinds of coherentism I’m thinking of: the first kind is sort of a nebulous coherentism, that it is better to prefer a set of beliefs that support one another over a set of incoherent beliefs. I would then call myself a ‘weak’ coherentist in a sense, as would most modern epistemologists, but we strive not just for the coherence of our beliefs as indicating its truth, but for the truth of all of our beliefs.

The second kind of coherentism I will call ‘strict coherentism.’ It sees no recourse necessary to any sort of a posteriori examination. This gambit is played, I think, in order to circumnavigate a serious problem for most justificationists: we may be justified in preferring a coherent system over an incoherent system.

Alice’s memory is wiped in a freak accident. She is recovering in a hospital room when a mad scientist abducts her and implants the following ideas in her head so that she holds them a priori:

p: ‘Barney the dinosaur exists’

q: ‘Barny talks’

r: ‘All dinosaurs talk’

Each member of the set is epistemically supported by the other members. ‘Barney the dinosaur’ can be replaced by any other nonexistent entity. ‘Talks’ can be replaced by any other property.

Thus, there are an infinite number of coherent systems that consists of false statements. If someone wishes to have a true coherent system, it appears that they better adopt some beliefs acquired through a posteriori examination. While we may give more weight to coherent systems over incoherent systems, that does not amount to much. We still need to determine which systems are true.

Quine’s holism matches with strict coherentist’s lack of interest in a posteriori examination. It is better, so Quine thinks, that the whole be maintained rather than to revise basic propositions. It is true that, if we so wish, we can maintain the whole come what may at the expense of the part. All crucial tests are theory-laden, so no ‘refutation’ is ever final. They remain ever-conjectural. We can make the choice to sacrifice nearly any part of the system to retain coherence, but often we will put to death a part that may be true, such as an observation report about the consequences of a crucial test, to keep a false theory protected from criticism.

Yet, this culling of the undesirables, while at times leading to true outcomes, may also lead to a willingness, as Quine admits, to revising all sorts of things, including the laws of logic from destroying an entire system.

I should make it clear that as a supporter of Bartley’s comprehensively critical rationalism, I admit that this revision may take place. I also admit that my beliefs may be incoherent. Yet, this admission does not constitute a criticism: I require more. We very well might, some time in the future, have to change what we take to be the very laws of logic. However, this would occur only under intense criticism, not out of a conventionalist stratagem to retain coherence at the expense of an observation report.

//

  1. Normally I do not learn article on blogs, however I would like to say
    that this write-up very forced me to check out and
    do it! Your writing taste has been amazed me.

    Thanks, very great post.

  2. Are you not worried that your position puts you in danger of committing what Nagel calls, “The view from no-where”?

    A big idea at the root of coherentist thought is that no one has a privileged view of the world, and it relies on ideas like Nietzsche’s “Perspectivism”. There are three logical features of the concept of perspective: (1) the same thing may be viewed from different perspectives; (2) there is no way to view the thing except from some perspective; (3) no perspective is “privileged” over any other.

    From the coherentist perspective there is no objective sense in which you know that someone’s coherentist version of truth has led to an untruth, the best you could really do is show that what has been thought to be coherent is incoherent instead.

    From a deflationist perspective it might be worrying to see how you use the term ‘truth’. Truth does not exist universally in all places and times, it does not live in a Platonic heaven, it exists only in instances. http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/deflationism-and-wittgenstein/

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s