The inductivist chooses to solve the problem of induction by assigning probabilities to theories. They are in search of theories that are immensely probable, not improbable: their goal is to adopt theories only if they are probably true. However, they are caught in a

*reductio*due to an unforeseen consequence: if they adopt probable theories, they ought to adopt theories with as little content as possible; one ought to adopt tautologies and historical claims of the form “I have observed …” — and nothing more.This goes against the stated aims of science*and*any sort of process of induction, since it shies away from making any sort of predictions.*Assigning probabilities to theories is then at odds with the process of induction*.Consider the theory “all ravens are black”. This theory is equivalent to the infinite conjunction of statements which the structure “The raven R is black.” However, since the probability of each unobserved raven cannot be assigned 1 without assuming

*a priori*the statement “the next observed raven R will be black,” it follows that every unobserved raven must be assigned a probability of X<1 of having blackness.Thus, the probability of the infinite conjunction with each conjunct being <1 approaches zero.

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